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In response to Eduardo Moisés Peñalver & Sonia K. Katyal, Property 
Outlaws, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1095 (2007). 
 
In Property Outlaws,
1
 Eduardo Peñalver and Sonia Katyal provoca-
tively argue that the violation of property laws can enhance the social 
order.  Using examples that include the settlement of the American 
West, lunch counter sit-ins, and urban squatting, Peñalver and Katyal 
maintain that the law’s proper development depends in some meas-
ure on the purposeful crossing of property boundaries.
2
  While these 
breaches disrupt order in the short run, Peñalver and Katyal suggest 
that they ultimately produce a more stable legal regime.  As the au-
thors put it, “[T]he apparent stability and order that property law pro-
vides owe much to the destabilizing role of the lawbreaker, who occa-
sionally forces shifts of entitlements and laws.”
3
  In short, the authors 
present a case for “order with outlaws.”
4
 
Peñalver and Katyal make an extremely important contribution to 
legal scholarship by identifying and examining potential benefits em-
bedded in what is usually a much-maligned activity—breaking prop-
erty laws.  Their exploration and synthesis of different lawbreaking 
contexts is creative, far ranging, and theoretically rich, and their tax-
onomy of outlaws adds a great deal of conceptual clarity.  Although 
the normative payoff of the project has yet to be fully articulated,
5
 the 
article’s analysis underscores a central challenge:  because most prop-
erty violations are damaging, we need some way to distinguish socially 
valuable boundary crossings from socially destructive ones.  The au-
thors suggest that ex post determinations may be able to perform this 
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sorting function,
6
 but this move only defers, rather than eliminates, 
the need for analytic guidance.  Building on what I view as the article’s 
most compelling theme—the information-generating function of law-
breaking
7
—I will suggest one way of approaching the question. 
I.  INFORMATIVE OUTLAWS 
The article’s most compelling claim is that lawbreaking can gen-
erate useful information.  As the authors explain, the information 
produced by the breaching of property boundaries can take several 
distinct forms.  First, at least where sanctions are significant or social 
stigma attaches to disobeying the law, lawbreaking transmits informa-
tion about the intensity of the outlaw’s preferences.
8
  Where the pref-
erences at issue relate to the valuation of a property entitlement, we 
would ordinarily rely on markets to gauge intensities.  But a knowing 
property violation can add information where a market transaction is 
unavailable, if the violation occurs under circumstances that allow us 
to draw inferences about the violator’s and the record owner’s relative 
valuations.  For example, adverse possession, if predicated on a know-
ing trespass, could provide just such a test of relative valuations.
9
 
Second, breaking a law that blocks particular entitlement recon-
figurations can help to overcome society’s “imaginative deficits” by of-
fering a glimpse of a world featuring those reconfigurations.
10
  In this 
way, information about the implications of a potential legal change 
can be vividly conveyed.  Peñalver and Katyal provide the powerful ex-
ample of lunch counter sit-ins, explaining that some people with seg-
regationist leanings changed their views when confronted with the re-
ality of individuals seeking service at a lunch counter.
11
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Third, a pattern of property violations can serve a diagnostic func-
tion by identifying distributive shortcomings in a legal system.
12
  The 
outlaw’s actions not only draw attention to the problem, but (return-
ing to the point above) instantiate one possible way of resolving it.
13
  
That the outlaw-initiated change in distribution will remain in place in 
the absence of legal enforcement or self-help on the part of the re-
cord owner may also generate useful information about relative valua-
tions—information that may bear on whether society should ratify the 
change.
14
  Instead of approving the specific violations in question, so-
ciety might respond through other reforms to distributive policy.
15
  
The point can be generalized further:  widespread disregard of a 
property law can be symptomatic of a legal or political defect whose 
root cause and most promising cure are far removed from the broken 
law in question. 
II.  LINE-DRAWING 
The observation that lawbreaking may have an informational sil-
ver lining is an important one, but it is not immediately obvious what 
to do with that insight.  Certainly, Peñalver and Katyal do not suggest 
that violations of property rights are always or even usually beneficial 
on net.  Yet, identifying the characteristics that distinguish the law-
breaking that we might want to encourage (or not overly discourage) 
from the mundane run of socially damaging property violations is no 
easy task.
16
  We need some way to sift from the great mass of potential 
violations those that are likely to offer especially high-quality informa-
tion that is unavailable from other sources.
17
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A.  Good Outlaws, Bad Outlaws 
One simple dimension along which we might sort outlaws is on 
the normative attractiveness of the ends that they are pursuing.  Here, 
we might initially be tempted to favor Peñalver and Katyal’s 
“[e]xpressive outlaws,” who violate the law to send a message, over 
“[a]cquisitive” or “intersectional” outlaws, whose violations are moti-
vated (in whole or in part) by a desire to redistribute resources in 
their own favor.
18
  But expressive outlaws can have unsavory agendas 
too, as the authors recognize.
19
  Consider an inversion of the lunch 
counter sit-in scenario.  Following Joseph Singer’s analysis, we might 
view public accommodations laws as having established an easement 
of sorts that allows people of all races to access meals at a private 
landowner’s lunch counter during normal hours of operation.
20
  
Viewed in these terms, a racist owner’s refusal of service is no less a 
property violation than the original sit-in, and the racist owner no less 
an expressive outlaw than the civil rights protestors.  Just as expressive 
ends can vary in normative valence, so too can acquisitive ends—an 
outlaw may act out of simple greed or abject need. 
After considering such possibilities, Peñalver and Katyal indicate 
that their analysis is meant “to encompass both actors whose ends we 
share and those whose ends we find reprehensible.”
21
  However, they 
go on to predict that their prescriptions will “likely . . . have different 
impacts on different sorts of property outlaws, based on differences in 
the objective circumstances and aims of the outlaws and in the de-
mocratic response to their activities.”
22
  This qualification  suggests an 
implicit reliance on either the political system or public opinion to 
provide a normative backstop.  Such a reliance seems to be somewhat 
in tension with the authors’ view of lawbreaking as a corrective to 
shortfalls in the majoritarian process.
23
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My point is not to criticize Peñalver and Katyal’s principled refusal 
to classify outlaws’ agendas based on perceived normative goodness, 
nor their apparent hope that truly bad outlaws will be recognized as 
such and treated accordingly.  But the existence (indeed, prevalence) 
of bad outlaws underscores the fact that altering property protections 
is not costless.  Accordingly, we should seek some analytic basis for iso-
lating those instances in which the information value of lawbreaking is 
high enough to be worth the risks involved. 
B.  Ownership Blockades 
We can gain some traction on the question by observing that 
when a property interest is protected by what Calabresi and Melamed 
term a “property rule,”
24
 there are two conceptually distinct ways that 
an outlaw might violate the owner’s interests.  An outlaw may appro-
priate the owner’s control over whether a transaction occurs (as the 
lunch counter protesters, who were happy to pay the going rate for 
their meals, were doing), or she may instead appropriate the value of 
the thing taken (as a shoplifter does when she makes off with a scarf 
that she could easily have purchased at the cash register).  Of course, 
many outlaws violate both elements of ownership simultaneously, as 
when a housebreaker steals a vase (carrying off the item’s value along 
with the owner’s prerogative not to sell the thing at all) or a trespasser 
tramples the daisies (depriving the owner of both the exclusion right 
and the flowers’ worth).  But the distinction remains important, be-
cause it helps to isolate a feature that is both central to property rights 
and vulnerable to societal revision—the owner’s veto power. 
1.  Outright Vetoes 
There is something special about an owner’s ability to block a 
transaction, and hence something noteworthy about lawbreaking that 
is narrowly focused on removing a blockade.  The ability to veto a 
transaction altogether—whether it means keeping someone from 
crossing one’s property line or preventing a neighbor from forcibly 
purchasing one’s home—is central to our notion of property.  But this 
right of exclusion also presents the danger that resources will be mo-
 
24
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nopolized in a way that will render them unavailable to a higher-
valuing user.  Property law already incorporates recognition of this 
fact through doctrines such as necessity, adverse possession, and emi-
nent domain.  Efforts by outlaws to overcome veto rights in new and 
different settings may generate useful information about value-
reducing blockades. 
2.  Prices as Vetoes 
Outright refusals to deal are only one way that an owner holding a 
property-rule-protected entitlement can block a transaction; prices are 
another.  Property rule protection differs from liability rule protection 
not only in precluding involuntary transfers of the owner’s entitle-
ment, but also in giving the owner control over the price at which any 
such transfer will occur.
25
  Liability rules, in contrast, strip the owner 
not only of the ability to resist a transfer in a claimant’s favor, but also 
of the ability to choose the price.
26
  Because a high price can block a 
transaction just as surely as an announcement that the entitlement is 
“not for sale,” the power to set prices can present concerns similar to 
those associated with veto rights.  But because subjective valuations are 
notoriously difficult to verify, an owner who is not granted control over 
price levels, as under a liability rule, may be forced to surrender some 
increment of value.
27
 
The upshot is that it will often be difficult to tell whether a high 
price represents a “price blockade” adopted for strategic or spiteful 
reasons or, instead, an honest statement of value.  This, in turn, makes 
outlaw behavior in response to the price signal difficult to classify.  
Nonetheless, we can readily distinguish cases in which goods are avail-
able at competitive prices but the outlaw simply wants to acquire them 
for a lower (or zero) price.  Such an outlaw is acting not to change the 
way that access to the good is structured or to overcome a strategic 
holdout problem, but rather only to alter the distributive outcome.  In 
the ordinary case, such a violation is unlikely to produce useful infor-
mation.
28
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3.  Challenges to Vetoes 
As a first cut, then, we might focus our attention on outlaws who 
break through a veto asserted by an owner with monopoly power over 
a resource.  By challenging the owner’s right to control whether a 
transaction occurs, such outlaws strike at the heart of what is uniquely 
property-like (and hence uniquely valuable and worrisome) about 
property—its reservation of veto rights to an owner.  This is not to say 
that all—or even most—challenges to veto rights are information rich, 
much less justified.  Property rules hold a privileged place in our sys-
tem of law, and for good reason.
29
  But when an owner is able to com-
pletely preclude access to a resource for which no good substitutes ex-
ist, the law should (and typically does) take notice.  Outlaws may help 
bring to light unnoticed or underappreciated impediments stemming 
from owners’ monopolization of resources. 
A focus on blockades also offers a way to distinguish veto-
challenging property violations, like lunch counter sit-ins, from viola-
tions that assert veto powers in areas where access has been legally 
mandated, like the exclusion practiced by the racist luncheonette 
owner.  This distinction dovetails with arguments about political iner-
tia.  As Peñalver and Katyal emphasize, “[P]roperty law is unusually re-
sistant to legal change,” for reasons that likely include the constitu-
tional protections extended to property interests and the vested 
interests that property-holders have in preserving the status quo.
30
  
The fact that property is by its very nature an access-constricting insti-
tution might suggest that this inertia typically operates in the direction 
of locking in veto rights, rather than locking in access rights.  If this is 
correct, property violations that challenge veto rights, especially those 
of long standing, might be expected to produce more meaningful in-
formation than would be generated by violations of access rights more 
recently established through the political process.
31
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III.  RESPONSES TO OUTLAWS 
As Peñalver and Katyal recognize, it is not enough to identify the 
sorts of violations that have high information content.  It is also neces-
sary to consider what adjustments (if any) we might make to property 
law to selectively elicit that information.  Avoiding an undue weaken-
ing of the property system as a whole is an obvious concern, and one 
that is reflected throughout the article.  Another problem, also recog-
nized by the authors, is that any legal incentive (or reduction in disin-
centive) for property violations will dilute the informational signal 
that a violation sends.
32
  Although Peñalver and Katyal grapple with 
these tensions at some length, approaching the question with the no-
tion of vetoes or blockades explicitly in mind can shed useful light. 
My focus on owners’ veto powers and my invocation of the work of 
Calabresi and Melamed might seem to suggest that liability rules 
would be the best way to harness the information generated by law-
breakers.  That is not necessarily the case.  Injunctive relief, the stan-
dard accompaniment to property rule protection, would indeed have 
an information-muffling effect, at least if it were imposed quickly 
enough to stop violations from occurring or from coming to the at-
tention of the polity.
33
  But liability rules are not the only alternative; 
property rules can also be enforced with supercompensatory penal-
ties.  Allowing outlaws to obtain stolen entitlements at their fair mar-
ket value—the liability rule solution—would be expected to underde-
ter violations and, at the same time, weaken the informational signal 
associated with a violation.  In many settings, a better answer will be to 
keep supercompensatory penalties in place that can meaningfully test 
the outlaw’s preference intensity without precluding her message 
from being heard. 
In some cases, however, the good being sought by the outlaw is of 
such an essential character that the presence of a legal blockade and 
the absence of any alternatives may be enough to make out a prima 
facie case against penalizing the violation.  The doctrine of necessity 
follows this reasoning, albeit in limited circumstances, and Peñalver 
and Katyal’s notion of “expressive necessity” would extend the idea to 
 
32
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33
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a subset of expressive lawbreaking.
34
  Peñalver and Katyal observe that 
“direct civil disobedience”—breaking the very property law that one is 
protesting—may at times represent the only feasible way to demon-
strate the implications of an entitlement realignment.
35
  Copyright’s 
fair use doctrine, which can permit limited borrowing from a work for 
purposes of parodying it,
36
 offers an interesting analogy.  Just as some 
amount of borrowing from a work is indispensible to a parody of that 
work,
37
 so too may access to property be necessary to critique the enti-
tlement system embedded within it.  In both cases, the owner controls 
an element essential to a particular message and for which there are 
no good substitutes.
38
 
A somewhat different challenge is presented by an acquisitive out-
law who is in such dire need that his violation communicates a fun-
damental failure of the social structure.
39
  As Jeremy Waldron has ar-
gued, the state’s withdrawal of all public places for performing 
necessary functions (such as sleeping) is logically inconsistent with the 
strong protection of private property rights, because these activities 
must be done somewhere if a person is to exist at all.
40
  In this context, 
no single owner holds a blocking monopoly on the resource in ques-
tion (a place to sleep), but all owners are collectively able to foreclose 
access to that resource to those who lack property of their own.
41
  
While the strong enforcement of private property boundaries may be 
necessary to avoid placing undue burdens on any particular private 
owner, exclusion from public places must hinge on the availability of 
some alternative location for performing essential life functions.  For 
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38
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example, in the wake of a Ninth Circuit opinion employing similar 
reasoning,
42
 the City of Los Angeles has recently agreed not to enforce 
bans on sidewalk sleeping, pending the provision of 1250 new beds for 
low-income persons.
43
  Such acts of provisional ratification are likely to 
generate important inputs to the political process. 
CONCLUSION 
Peñalver and Katyal persuasively argue that property violations 
can, at times, generate information that is discourse-enhancing, mar-
ket perfecting, inertia defeating, reform inducing, and, ultimately, or-
der preserving.  But most property violations destabilize the social or-
der without producing any significant offsetting benefits.  The 
authors’ analysis highlights the need for greater analytic clarity about 
the kinds of violations—and the kinds of remedies for them—that 
tend to generate net informational benefits.  In pursuing that objec-
tive, it seems fair to observe that much of what pushes our intuitions 
about property outlaws has at its heart anxiety about the very potent 
veto rights that we extend to owners.  Those rights are fundamental to 
our vision of ownership, but they have also been hedged about with 
exceptions and modifications to prevent owners from unduly blocking 
transactions.  The work of refining property law to strike the right bal-
ance between access and exclusion is always ongoing, and Peñalver 
and Katyal skillfully show us that outlaws can offer useful, if unconven-
tional, guidance. 
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